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Abstract: Do formal legal institutions complement or substitute social network mechanisms of
knowledge protection? We explore how the composition and structure of firms’ international
alliance networks changes in response to the passage of intellectual property rights (IPR) laws in
their home countries. We find that, when IPR laws are strengthened, firms form more
international alliances, particularly if they operate in IP intensive industries, and do so with
partners from a greater diversity of countries. The significance of status (centrality) as a predictor
of international alliance formation decreased after the passage of IPR laws, in line with a
substitution effect that ‘democratized’ access to the global network by increasing the
participation of firms that were peripheral before the legal changes. In contrast, the closure of
firms’ alliance networks increased with stronger IPR laws, in line with a complementarity effect
that increased the use of social control. The increase in closure was strongest in the networks of
the low status entrants into the global network. Using a difference-in-difference empirical design,
we found that these changes coincided exactly with the timing of the passage of the laws across
thirteen countries between 1988 and 2005. This study addresses issues of great theoretical and
practical importance to the literatures on institutions, networks, and IPR.
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In an increasingly knowledge-based economy, interfirm collaborations are essential for
many firms and industries. These collaborations are often globally dispersed because knowledge
and resources are widely distributed across countries (Rosenkopf and Almeida 2003). But
capturing the value created by these global partnerships is a major concern for the firms
involved. One of the most pressing issues in this regard is the lack of uniformity in intellectual
property rights (IPR) across markets. Because IPR affects the amount of value appropriated by
firms involved in global partnerships, firms in places with weak IPR struggle to attract foreign
partners, who may be wary of losing their valuable knowledge without proper compensation
(Zhao, 2006).
To address these concerns, researchers and practitioners have focused on two types of
institutional mechanisms. One the one hand, formal regulation that protects IPR induces firms to
invest and combine their resources by alleviating concerns related to expropriation by defining
property rights, enabling contracts, and providing legal recourse in the case of contractual
breaches (Zucker 1986; Teece 1986; North 1990). On the other hand, informal mechanisms of
protection can play a functionally similar role. Scholars from many disciplines have shown that
mechanisms rooted in social norms and relationships can also be effective means to protect
firms’ intellectual property and other resources from expropriation (Granovetter 1985; Zucker
1986; Greif 1993). Yet a fundamental but unsettled question is how formal and informal
mechanisms of knowledge protection affect one another.
In this paper we focus on how firms’ use of informal, socially rooted mechanisms of IP
protection changes when formal IPR protection is legally strengthened. While the passage of IPR
laws is typically beyond the control of firms, the frequency with which firms participate in
external collaborations and how they structure the network created by those collaborations in
response to threats to their knowledge resources is more strategic in nature (Gulati 1999;
Hernandez, Sanders, and Tuschke 2015). We take advantage of a series of changes in the law
that strengthened IPR protection across several countries to examine how the composition and
structure of firms’ global alliance networks responds to those laws. We address two outcomes of

3

theoretical interest. First, we examine whether strengthening IPR laws facilitates greater access
to international alliance partners, by allegedly reducing the perceived risk of expropriation. We
expect that formal IPR will not only allow firms to have a greater number of international
partners, but that the composition of the firm’s network will become more diverse in terms of the
nationalities represented.
Second, we assess whether IPR laws substitute or complement the use of informal network
mechanisms associated with knowledge protection. Research has considered two means by
which firms can rely on networks to protect their resources. One mechanism is to partner with
others of high status or reputation—usually reflected in the centrality of the partner in the
network (e.g. Podolny 2001). Status serves as a signal of the trustworthiness of the partner, and
also acts as insurance against malfeasance because of the loss of reputation that high status actors
would suffer in the event of opportunistic behavior. Another mechanism is to embed the tie with
the partner in question within a dense network—usually reflected in the closure of the focal
actor’s network (Coleman, 1988). Closure can be effective as a device to protect IP because it
limits the flow of information outside of the dense cluster of ties, fosters common norms of
behavior, and thus facilitates social monitoring (Lin 2001).
We argue that the strengthening of formal IPR in a country diminishes the use of status as a
mechanism to facilitate tie formation and enhances the incidence of closure as a knowledge
protection structure. In the absence of IPR laws, firms can only rely on informal means to protect
their IP when participating in international alliance networks. The network status of a firm from
a country with weak IPR is a particularly useful, albeit noisy, signal of reliability for foreign
partners. High status firms thus disproportionately accrue the few foreign partnership
opportunities available for firms from IPR regimes. When IPR laws are strengthened, foreign
firms are significantly more willing to partner with a wider set firms from the reforming country
because they can rely on formal means to protect their assets. This ‘democratization’ effectively
opens up the global alliance network to a greater number of firms, especially those that were
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previously peripheral or of low status, and results in a post-reform decrease in the significance of
centrality as a driver of tie formation.
At the same time, the increased participation of many new, low status firms in the global
network after IPR reforms results in the increased use of closure as a means of knowledge
protection. Though foreign firms may now consider entering alliances with firms that are
relatively lower in status, the absence of a reputation-based means of assurance requires firms to
rely on an alternative informal mechanism. While the law provides some protection, it does not
cover all the day-to-day issues that may arise in a partnership (North 1990). Research has
demonstrated that a closed network can be a useful complement to formal protection because it
provides the ability to monitor partners and fosters an agreed upon a set of norms that can be
socially enforced in routine interactions (Hernandez et al. 2015; Hallen et al. 2014). We therefore
expect that network closure will increase following the strengthening of formal IPR protection,
and that the increase will be most pronounced in the networks of firms that were of low status
before the IPR reforms.
We tested these ideas examining the networks of firms from thirteen countries that passed
meaningful patent protection reforms (Branstetter, Fisman, and Foley 2006). The sample covers
11,035 firms during 1988-2005 and their alliance networks composed of partners from all over
the world. An attractive feature of the setting is that we can make strong statistical inferences by
taking advantage of the exogenous timing of the passage of IPR laws across the different
countries. Using a multiple event difference-in-difference design, we find support for our
hypotheses. The strengthening of IPR laws significantly increased the number of international
alliances formed by firms from the reforming countries, particularly in IP-intensive industries,
and enhanced the cross-national diversity of firms’ alliance partners. These changes coincided
exactly with the timing of the passage of the laws in each market. The significance of centrality
(high status) as a predictor of international alliance formation decreased after the passage of IPR
laws, in line with a substitution effect. In contrast, stronger IPR laws increased the closure of

5

firms’ alliance networks, especially those that were of low status during the weak IPR regime, in
line with a complementarity effect.
These results are important because they address a fundamental question in the dilemma
faced by firms in markets with weak formal institutions seeking to attract international
collaborators. While research on formal and informal mechanisms to protect knowledge and
resources has generally developed along parallel paths—especially work on “macro” institutions
and research on interfirm networks—we integrate the two. We show that formal IPR
strengthening has nuanced effects on firms’ use of informal network governance. Status based
mechanisms of assurance become less relevant to tie formation, suggesting that the law
‘democratizes’ access to alliance partners by allowing less central firms to enter the global
network. To accommodate this entry, informal means based on network embeddedness become
more prevalent, suggesting that the law increases demand for this mechanism. This demonstrates
the institutional origins of network composition and structure, bringing together two literatures
that have been “oddly disconnected” (Powell et al. 2005). Another valuable contribution is the
strength of the empirical design, which allows us to approach causality in making these claims.
Finally, the phenomenon is of great managerial and policy importance because it provides
relevant facts about the efficacy of efforts to strengthen IPR laws.
BACKGROUND
Institutions and networks exist because cooperation can be beneficial for value creation
but problematic for value appropriation. While cooperation can take many forms, here we are
interested in that between firms engaged in joint work through cross-border alliances. These
international collaborations have increased dramatically over the last few decades as
globalization has made opportunities for value creation through resource sharing across
geographies a highly attractive proposition (Gomes-Casseres 1996), particularly when it comes
to knowledge-related activities (Zaheer and Hernandez 2011). Indeed, much academic and
managerial writing has been dedicated to the value creation aspects of such alliances (Lavie 2006
provides a good review). But as firms from various national jurisdictions come in contact with
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one another, issues of value appropriation due to uneven intellectual property rights (IPR)
protection have become one of the most (if not the most) important concerns reported by
managers (Teece 1986; Ginarte and Park 1997; Zhao 2006).
The issue of operating in markets with weak IPR has been addressed in prior literature.
For example, Zhao (2006) asked how MNEs overcome the appropriability concerns of
conducting R&D in countries with weak IPR. She proposed an institutional arbitrage framework
by which the complexity and complementarity of internal linkages between technologies within
the firm serve as a barrier to imitation. Alcacer and Zhao (2012) further show how that such
strong internal linkages allow firms to protect their IP from spillover in industry clusters where
knowledge spillovers are likely. Other research focuses on different actions or strategies firms
can follow to safeguard their knowledge in weak IPR regimes (e.g. Singh 2008; Agarwarl,
Ganco, and Ziedonis 2009; Schotter and Teagarden 2014). But the emphasis has been primarily
on protections for IP-related activities that firms conduct internally. Yet a significant portion of
firms’ knowledge related activities, as just mentioned, are done in collaboration with other firms.
Firms originating from countries with weak IPR regimes are at a marked disadvantage in
attracting partners from the global alliance network. If firms from these countries lag
technologically, foreign partnerships have the promise of providing needed know-how to
upgrade firms’ capabilities. But potential foreign partners will be wary of losing their IP and
having no legal recourse to adjudicate disputes. And even if firms from weak IPR countries have
strong technological capabilities, foreign partnerships are valuable in providing access to new
markets or complementary technologies. But, once again, foreign firms will have concerns of
unwanted knowledge spillovers into the weak IPR location. Hence firms from weak IPR
countries have both strong incentives and major constraints to establish international alliances.
For collaborations to arise in these situations, firms need to be able to trust that their partners will
not expropriate them. Zucker (1986) identifies three different mechanisms by which trust may be
generated: process-based, characteristic-based, and institution-based. Institution-based
mechanisms are rooted in formal laws, codes, standards and other formal means. The hallmark of
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these is that they are impersonal, arms-lengths means of securing exchange between
counterparties. In our setting, these formal institutions correspond to laws protecting IPR within
countries. Process- and characteristic-based mechanisms are both informal in nature and rooted
in social, personal processes. But they operate in different ways. Characteristic-based trust is
rooted in reliance on the identity of the other party, such as co-ethnicity or membership in a
common organization (e.g. alumni group) (Greif 1993). This kind of informal institution
corresponds to reliance on the network status of an actor (Podolny 1992), as we elaborate below.
Process-based trust is rooted in prior interactions or repeated exchange with others, and
corresponds to the concepts of embeddedness and closure in the networks literature (Granovetter
1985; Coleman 1988). Our study examines the interplay between each of these three institutional
mechanisms of governance.
An issue that will permeate much of this paper is the fundamental question of whether
formal and informal institutions substitute or complement one another. Strong arguments have
been made in favor of both propositions (see Poppo and Zenger 2002). As we discuss more
below, North’s (1990) work is ambivalent about this issue. While he tends to assume that even in
the most advanced societies informal constraints play an important role in ongoing economic
exchange, he also makes a strong case that economic progress is frequently predicated on
replacing socially based exchange with formal, arms-length transacting (see also Zucker 1986).
Perhaps the fairest characterization of North’s research is that the interplay of the two types of
institutions depends on historical circumstances.
Granovetter's (1985) celebrated work puts forward the view that relational norms can
govern collaborative exchange even in the absence of explicit formal contracts and institutions
that support their enforcement. This has frequently been inferred as support for the notion that
formal and informal governance mechanisms are functional substitutes, a view that has been
expanded on by subsequent research (Hill 1990; Dyer 1997; Adler 2001). Rangan (2000:1),
building on Granovetter's (1985) work concludes that “when actors need to but cannot,
independently or via market mechanisms, cost-effectively ascertain the identity and reliability of
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potential exchange partners, then scope exists for social networks to appreciably and
systematically influence efficiency”; otherwise, formal incentives dominate socially based
exchange. However, some scholars have also argued that informal governance continues to play
an important role even in the presence of formal protections. Poppo and Zenger (2002), focusing
on “micro” institutions (i.e. organizational forms rather than laws), argue that formal contracts
and relational governance are complements. They propose that contracts create incentives for
partners to invest in relational routines through repeated exchange, while relational governance
allows firms to develop more customized contractual solutions. Helmke and Levitsky (2004)
attempt to resolve the contradictory arguments by suggesting that complementarity or
substitution between types of institutions depends on whether they have compatible objectives
and whether informal institutions are effective in accomplishing their objectives.
Our purpose here is not to fully summarize the literature on this debate, but to point out
that the issue is not settled. In what follows, we distinguish between informal institutions that
resolve exchange concerns through signaling—based on network status—and those that
ameliorate concerns by constraining information and norms of behavior—based on network
closure. We will argue that this distinction is important because formal institutions (IPR laws, in
our case) will substitute for one but complement the other. We posit that complementarity and
substitution are not necessarily driven by the functional attributes of formal vs. informal
institutions, as prior research argues. Instead, they can be explained by the fact that status-based
mechanisms are limited in supply while closure-based mechanisms are more broadly accessible
as participation in the network increases after the strengthening of formal institutions. We
elaborate on this in the hypothesis development.
HYPOTHESES
Network Tie Formation
We start with a pair of baseline hypotheses that, while theoretically straightforward, are
practically of great importance. While scholars and policy makers expect that the passage or
strengthening of IPR laws “works” by reducing appropriability concerns, the effects of these
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laws on firms’ ability to attract foreign alliance partners has not been empirically verified. Since
international partnerships are frequently the most important vehicle by which firms from weak
IPR countries gain access to new technologies, capabilities, and markets (Siegel 2007; Palepu,
Khanna, and Vargas 2006), this outcome is highly important for managers and policy makers.
We expect that the passage (or significant strengthening) of IPR laws will have such an effect.
Further, the effect should be particularly strong for firms in industries that are IP intensive
because those firms stand to benefit the most from the reforms. Hence,
Hypothesis 1a: Firms in countries that strengthen IPR laws form more international
alliances after the passage of the laws.
Hypothesis 1b: Firms from IP intensive industries in countries that strengthen IPR laws
form more international alliances after the passage of the laws than firms from low
technology industries.
From a networks perspective, the preceding hypotheses establish that IPR laws increase
tie formation activity. But the composition and structure of a firm’s network are key to
determining how much and in what way it will benefit from participating in the network (Gulati
and Gargiulo 1999; Ahuja 2000; Rosenkopf and Schillin 2007). By composition we refer to the
attributes of a focal firm’s network partners, whereas by structure we refer to the position the
firm occupies in terms of how ties are distributed between the focal firm and others. The
remaining hypotheses focus on these issues.
Network Composition
We focus first on how IPR laws affect network composition. If the strengthening of
formal institutions affects tie formation by reducing the appropriability concerns of foreign
partners, this should allow firms to not only attract more foreign partners, but partners from a
greater variety of countries than the firm was able to before the strengthening of IPR. There is a
difference between a firm from, say, Argentina that engaged in alliances with Spanish firms
before IPR was strengthened and now increases the frequency and intensity of its alliances with
Spanish partners and the same firm now having access to new partners from Japan, the U.S., and
Brazil. In both cases we would observe an increase in the rate of international tie formation (per
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H1a and H1b), but only in the latter would we observe that the global diversity of ties also
increases. If firms only formed more ties with firms from foreign countries to which they already
had ties, then legal changes would simply be reinforcing previous linkages among countries that
already exchanged with one another because of specific bilateral factors (such as prior colonial
ties or immigration patterns).
In contrast, if firms diversify the countries from which they find alliance partners, the
legal change is creating opportunities for firms to access new ideas through access to novel parts
of the global knowledge network. Exposure to partners from distinct national jurisdictions is a
source of resource and knowledge diversity. The persistent differences across countries across
many dimensions—institutional, cultural, or economic (Ghemawat, 2001)—create pockets of
idiosyncratic knowledge, technologies, practices, and other resources. Of relevance to the
domain of IP-related issues is research demonstrating that countries have unique national
innovation systems (Nelson 1993), and that firms with networks that span various innovation
systems derive innovation and other performance benefits (Lavie and Miller 2008; Vasudeva,
Zaheer, and Hernandez 2013). If the passage of laws that strengthen IPR works as intended, the
laws should lower expropriation concerns for foreign firms from all other countries rather than
just from the ones with whom firms in the reforming country had pre-existing ties. Hence,
Hypothesis 2: Firms in countries that strengthen IPR laws form international alliances to
partners from a more diverse set of countries after the passage of the laws.
Network Structure
We now consider how IPR laws affect the structural properties of firm’s networks. These
effects are important because network structure is often viewed as playing a role similar to that
of formal institutions such as IPR laws. Like formal institutions, network structure can serve as a
means of reducing concerns of exchange hazards between partners engaged in economic
transactions (Granovetter 1985). Hence, whether and in what ways network mechanisms of IP
protection substitute or complement formal institutional means is a fundamental question.
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We explore two distinct attributes of networks that have been viewed as means of
informal protection against opportunistic behavior. High status in a network functions as a signal
of unobservable quality (Podolny 1993) and plays a prominent role in trust generation because it
functions like the characteristic-based mechanisms discussed by Zucker (1986). Under
conditions of uncertainty, high status firms tend to disproportionately attract resources and
network ties because others use status as a proxy for desirability as an exchange partner (Podolny
2001). Status is a prized resource that the possessor does not want to compromise through
opportunistic behavior and the reputational fallout such behavior could elicit (Jensen and Roy
2008). Another view proposes that organizations with networks that are closed, dense, or tightly
knit (we will use closure from now on) are able to safeguard valuable resources (Coleman,
1988), particularly sensitive knowledge-based ones (Hernandez et al. 2015). When network
participants must protect a prized resource, closure is valuable for a few reasons. First, a dense
web of ties allows firms to more easily obtain information about the actions of others, in essence
lowering the costs of monitoring—one of the fundamental roles of institutions (North 1990).
Second, closed networks tend to be composed of actors who share similar norms of behavior and
increase the odds that norms will be socially enforced when deviations occur (Coleman 1988),
akin to the process-based means of trust production discussed by Zucker (1986). Notice that
status and closure operate through different means—the former through signaling, the latter
through informational and normative constraints. We will argue that the strengthening of IPR
laws diminishes the use of status-based mechanisms and heightens the use of closure-based
mechanisms.
Status Substitution. In a series of papers, Podolny shows that status has economic value
because it serves as a signal of firm quality and reliability (1993, 2001). One of the main
empirical approaches to show this is to demonstrate that the returns to status increase with the
level of ‘altercentric uncertainty’ (Podolny 2001). Altercentric uncertainty refers to the inability
of external parties (or network alters) to ascertain the quality and trustworthiness the focal firm
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(the ego) as an exchange partner.1 Status in the network (usually measured as eigenvector
centrality, as we discuss later) reduces altercentric uncertainty by signaling that a potential
exchange partner is reliable. Empirical work thus shows that status is most valuable to firms as a
means of attracting partners when altercentric uncertainty is high (Podolny 1992, 2001).
The function of status can be likened to that of formal institutional constraints, which
serve as a means to reduce concerns of hazardous behavior between actors. In the absence of
formal institutional solutions to the problem of partner screening, status becomes a crucial
enabler of tie formation. In our context, foreign partners are more willing to form alliances with
the most central (high status) firms in countries with weak IPR. For example, high status firms
such as those in business groups disproportionately attract foreign partners in these countries
(e.g. Palepu, Khanna, and Vargas 2006; Siegel 2007). But when IPR laws are meaningfully
strengthened, a more credible and formalized means of reducing appropriability concerns exists
for foreign firms establishing ties with firms from the reforming country (Rangan 2000). This
should lead foreign firms to be more willing to ally with firms that were less prominent in the
pre-reform regime. One reason may be that formal laws decrease altercentric uncertainty. But
this does not necessarily mean that the threat of reputation loss as a mechanism to protect against
opportunistic behavior is less desirable for foreign partners after the passage of the laws. Rather,
the introduction of formal institutions broadens the consideration set of viable partners from the
reforming country, and thus status plays a less determining role in tie formation.
North (1990:46) discusses how “the shift from status to contract has been amply
discussed” in historical accounts of economic development. As economic actors seek to engage
in complex exchanges—and IP-related exchanges across firms are highly complex—formal
institutions tend to replace some socially based mechanisms of governance based on the identity
of the exchange partner (e.g. status, clientilization, cronyism) (Zucker 1986; North 1990; Greif
1993). This should result in a ‘democratization’ of participation in economic exchange when

This contrasts with ‘egocentric uncertainty, or the uncertainty that the focal firm itself faces when going about its
usual activities.
1
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formal institutions are strengthened. From a networks perspective, this means that new ties will
accrue disproportionately less than before to highly central firms. This should be reflected in a
broader set of firms being able to attract international alliance partners instead of those that had
high status in the network before the passage of IPR laws. Thus:
Hypothesis 3: The effect of network centrality on the number of international alliances
formed by a firm declines when IPR laws become stronger in the country of the focal
firm.
Closure Complementarity. Despite the preceding hypothesis, it would be premature to
conclude that formal protection can replace all types of informal institutions (Poppo and Zenger
2002). As just mentioned, the increase participation in the network is driven by firms that were
previously less able to attract foreign partners because of their low status. They were peripheral
in the network and thus deemed risky in the absence of formal institutional assurances. IPR laws
may increase the willingness to partner with low status firms, but laws are never fully effective
on their own. North (1990) makes this point forcefully. For example: “The difference between
informal and formal constraints is one of degree” (1990:46) “[Formal regulation through
coercive power] is never ideal, never perfect, and the parties to the exchange still devote
immense resources to attempting to clientize exchange relationships. But neither selfenforcement by parties not trust can be completely successful… Indeed, effective third-party
enforcement is best realized by creating a set of rules that then make a variety of informal
constraints effective” (1990:35) Further, “Formal rules can complement and increase the
effectiveness of informal constraints. They may lower information, monitoring, and enforcement
costs and hence make informal constraints possible solutions to more complex exchange”
(1990:46-47).
If laws are complemented by informal constraints, the issue is that the majority of the
new participants in the network are not of high status. Indeed, status is by definition a rare
commodity. Hence foreign firms partnering with those in the reforming country must rely on an
alternative informal mechanism to complement the law. Closure can play this role. Granovetter
(1985) suggested that economic actors frequently embed transactions in social relationships.
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Subsequent research explored this idea from a networks perspective, suggesting that firms can
structurally embed resource exchanges in social relations by forming ties to others with whom
both parties have a common contact (Gulati 1998). This tie formation behavior results in
networks rich in closed triads (high closure or density), which, as argued previously, allow firms
to control the flow of information and increase the likelihood of developing and enforcing an
agreed upon set of norms (social control). As Lin (2001:27) argues, “the root of preferring a
dense or closed network lies in certain outcomes of interest. For preserving or maintaining
resources… denser networks may have a relative advantage… On the other hand, for searching
for and obtaining resources not presently possessed… accessing an extending bridges in the
network should be more useful.” (Lin, 2001: 27). Recent work has empirically validated this
proposition by showing that when a firm’s sensitive knowledge is exposed to unwanted leakage
to rivals firms tend to increase network closure (Hernandez et al. 2015).
Network closure is thus useful after the passage of IPR laws because it can help address
many of the day-to-day interactions between partners that are not explicitly covered by the legal
framework. Indeed, trying to rely only on the formal constraints would be inefficient when minor
disputes or unexpected situations arise. Reliance on a dense network to monitor situations and
appeal to a socially accepted set of values and norms is likely to be more effective and “fill in”
the gaps in formal legal frameworks (Uzzi 1997). The functioning of formal institutions
ultimately depends on a series of underlying values and agreed upon norms of behavior, or
“moral constraints on behavior” (North 1990:60), that are consistent with the objectives of the
institutional structure. In network-based exchange such as the international alliances of this
study, being able to trust that partners share certain values consistent with the intent of IPR laws
is crucial. Network closure, which facilitates shared norms of behavior and their social
enforcement, accomplishes this.
Because of its value as a complement to formal constraints, the demand for closure will
increase after the passage of IPR laws. To be clear, we are not saying that closure was ineffective
before the reforms; only that it was less prevalent. Since closure is not a dyadic property, it
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requires the participation of third parties to whom the firm from the focal country and the foreign
partner are tied. But pre-reform, the network was relatively sparse, thus limiting the availability
of common third parties to provide social control. The significant increase in network
participation (per H1a and H2) increases the odds of finding third parties linked to firms from the
reforming country. Further, because the increase in participation is greatest among firms that
lack network status (H3), the demand for closure will be greatest among for partnerships
involving these low status firms. Thus,
Hypothesis 4: The alliance networks of firms in countries that strengthen IPR laws
become more closed after the passage of the laws.
Hypothesis 5: The increase in closure in the alliance networks of firms in countries that
strengthen IPR laws is stronger the lower the network centrality of the firm before the
IPR laws are strengthened.
While each hypothesis is interesting by itself, the overall story told by the set of
hypotheses is important because it provides a fairly comprehensive understanding of how firms’
use of informal network mechanisms responds to the availability of formal legal institutions. The
passage of IPR laws increases the supply of international alliances partners for firms from the
countries that pass those laws (per H1a, H1b). This supply of partners is not just greater in
quantity, but in the diversity of locations from which partners are available (H2). The
democratization of access to the global network is reflected in a decline in the importance of
status as a driver of international tie formation (H3). Because the supply of high status firms is
limited, it cannot meet the heightened demand for informal institutional assurances. At the same
time, the broader participation of firms from the reforming country in the global network
increases opportunities to use closure as an informal institution (H4), particularly in the networks
of the new, low status entrants into the network (H5).
DATA AND METHODS
Our sampling frame consists of firms from thirteen countries that passed substantial laws
to strengthen patent protection during the 1990’s. We drew information about these IPR changes
and their timing from Branstetter, Fisman, and Foley (2006). They define an improvement in IPR
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as a governmental intervention that leads to expansions of eligible inventions, patent scope or
patent length as well as improvements in patent enforcement and administration. We refer the
reader to the appendix of Branstetter et al. (2006) for a very detailed explanation of the reforms
in each country. The basic research design of our study is similar to theirs (and subsequent
studies such as Branstetter et al. 2010, 2011) in that we take advantage of differences in the
timing of IPR changes across markets to assess the pre vs. post change in outcomes of interest
(i.e. a difference-in-difference design).
Our primary firm and network data source is the SDC Platinum database from which we
drew information on interfirm alliances. This is the most comprehensive source of global
interfirm alliances across multiple industries (Schilling 2009).2 Alliance data of a reasonable
quality in SDC Platinum is only available starting in 1988. We were thus forced to drop firms
from some of the original sixteen countries making significant law changes identified by
Branstetter et al. (2006) because they occurred prior to 1988. These include Japan (1983), South
Korea (1987), Spain (1986) and Taiwan (1986). In addition to the remaining twelve countries in
the original study, our sample also included India, which was identified by Branstetter et al.
(2006) as passing a significant IPR reform but not included in their analysis as 1999 was the last
year in their sample. The thirteen countries in our sample are listed in Table 1 along with the
years in which the legal changes occurred. We note that there is disagreement as to the actual
effectiveness of IPR changes in China and Argentina, but our results remain generally robust if
we exclude firms from those countries. The findings are also robust to excluding any one country
at a time from the analysis.
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE
Our sample includes 11,035 firms from the thirteen IPR-changing countries that
participated in an alliance between 1988-2005 as indicated by SDC Platinum. Though our focal
firms are only from the countries in which we observe the legal changes, their alliances could be

2

The only other source with fairly global coverage, the MERIT-CATI database, was discontinued in 2013 because
SDC Platinum contained superior information.
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with firms from anywhere in the world. We consider alliance ties to be active for a period of
three years, consistent with similar standard assumptions in alliance research (e.g. Gulati 1995).
For example, a firm’s network in 1991 consists of all ties formed between 1989-1992, inclusive.

Dependent Variables
To test H1a/b, we capture the number of new international ties as a logged count of the
number of new alliances that the focal firm establishes in a given year with partners that are
based in a different country to its own, as classified by SDC’s alliance participant location data.
To test H2, we capture the international dispersion of a firm’s partners, partner national
diversity, as 1 - ∑i Si2 where Si is the fraction of the firm’s partners that are from country i.
Because we want to ensure that the results for H4 are not driven by one particular way of
measuring closure, we use a variety of measures expecting to find similar results across them.
We calculate the network constraint for the focal firm’s ego-network, following Burt (1992), as
∑j (pij + ∑q piqpqj) 2. Higher values of constraint indicate networks with more closure. As a
simpler measure of this same concept we count the number of ties (common third parties) that
exist between a firm’s partners. Since this measure is likely to be influenced by the number of
partners the firm has, we use a measure of normalized bridging ties, which is the logged ratio of
the count of common third parties among the focal firm’s partners to the total number of partners
the firm has (i.e. its degree). We also use a measure of network density, captured as the ratio of
the number of ties between the firm’s partners to the maximum possible number of ties that
could exist between them (i.e. Bridging tiesi /nC2, where n is the number of partners firm i has in
the year in question.
Independent Variables
Our principal independent variables of interest are the aforementioned post reform and
the various indicator variables capturing a series of years before and after the year preceding the
reform. To test H3, also in the spirit of not relying on one particular network variable, we use
three different measures of the firm’s network centrality: degree is a simple logged count of the
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number of partners the firm possesses in a given year, eigenvector centrality (Bonacich 1987) is
a measure that weights each of the firm’s ties by the centrality of the actor to which it is
associated (and is the measure most frequently associated with status (e.g. Podolny, 2001)), and
component size is the number of other firms to which the focal firm can connect through its
network (regardless of distance), i.e. the number of other firms present in the same network
component as the focal firm.
The variable patent intensive indicates whether the industry to which the firm belongs
(based on the firm’s primary 4 digit SIC code) is classified as being patent intensive. We use two
different classifications to ensure robustness. The primary classification we use was generated by
the US Patent Office (USPTO 2012) based on a multi-year analysis of patenting behavior across
all industries in the economy. The other classification was independently created by the
European Patent Office (EPO and OHIM, 2013) in a similar study, and results in substantially
similar results.
Control Variables
Countries that pass IPR strengthening reform are likely to simultaneously be undergoing
other changes that could influence alliance activity. The fact that our empirical design identifies
effects by comparing only across similar countries using multiple events over a relatively short
space of time allows us to be more precise in pinning the observed effects to our causes of
interest. In addition we also control for various other events that could be occurring in these
countries. Primarily, many of these countries are also likely to have been undergoing broader
economic liberalization and opening up their markets to external influences (Henisz, Zelner and
Guillen 2005). We identify significant liberalizing regulatory changes in the countries of interest
from Wacziarg and Welch (2003). To control for these we include a liberalization dummy
variable to indicate the year in which such a change occurred in the home country of the firm.
Further, we also control for the extent to which the countries in our sample are open to capital
flows based on Quinn and Toyoda (2008). This variable (cap flows openness) is on a 0-100 scale
with 100 representing an economy that is fully open to capital flows. In addition, the passage of
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IPR reform in a proximate country may affect the alliance activity of the firms in the focal
country. To account for this we include a variable – reformed neighbors – which is a running
count of the number of other countries in the same continent as the focal country which have
passed meaningful patent reform based on our data.
We control for the number of new domestic ties that a firm generates in a particular year,
measured as a logged count. While our interest is on the formation of international alliances, the
investment made in domestic alliances can enable or constrain firms in establishing foreign ties.
We also include a yearly measure of political constraint (polcon) in the focal country, which
reflects the number of veto players present in the country’s governing structure (Henisz 2000).
This could influence the timing and nature of the laws passed as well as the degree to which
firms are able to influence the government. We also control for the FDI inflows into the country
and total exports of goods and services out of the country, as well as the country’s hi-tech
exports, measured as the dollar value of the country’s exports in products with high R&D
intensity as defined by the World Bank.
Quality of infrastructure could be an important facilitator of international alliances that
may vary concurrently with the passage of IPR laws. To control for this we include the number
of cellphone connections per 100 people as well as the Internet connectivity of the country
measured as the number of Internet users per 100 people. We also control for the total number of
commercial flight takeoffs during the year from the country’s airports, which may proxy for the
accessibility of the focal country to international markets. The relative wealth of the local
population may also be a consideration for foreign firms interested in local markets, therefore we
control for the country’s GNI per capita. Finally, we include the proportion of the country’s
population living in urban areas (urban population fraction) as a proxy for ease of access to
labor, which may influence the interest of foreign firms in forming alliances with local firms.
Since the timing of IPR changes across markets is a central part of the identification
strategy (as explained next), the need for many control variables is not as strong as in a cross-
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sectional or fixed-effects design. This is because many firm-specific factors that may impact tie
formation or network structure are unlikely to coincide exactly with the timing of laws.
Design and Estimation
We consider each IPR law change to be a ‘treatment’ event and use a multiple event
difference-in-difference design in which firms from countries in which the law change has not
occurred act as controls for the firms in countries that have experienced a law change. As is
typical for this research design, our primary independent variable, post reform, is an indicator
equal to 1 for a particular firm in all the years following the passage of the law in its home
country and 0 otherwise. The coefficient of this variable gives us the difference-in-difference
estimate. In addition, some of the hypotheses are tested using a triple difference (difference-indifference-in-difference) design by interacting post reform with a further indicator. For instance,
in H1b we interact post reform with patent intensive and for H3 we interact post reform with
centrality. The coefficient of these interactions reflects the additional ‘difference’ in how
different types of firms react after IPR changes, further strengthening statistical inference.
This empirical design allows us to approach causality in our empirical claims. We are
examining the pre- vs. post-treatment difference (the first difference) between the treated and
control firms (the second difference). For our estimates to be biased we would require a violation
of the parallel trends assumption, i.e. in the absence of treatment, the treated and control groups
would have to display systematically different variation in outcomes (i.e. they would need to be
trending differently) at the time of treatment (Angrist and Pischke, 2008). In other words,
following the treatment year in question the firms from the treated countries would have to a
display a systematically different change in their alliance behavior compared to the firms from
the untreated countries in the absence of treatment. Furthermore, since our identification relies
on multiple events rather than just one, this systematic difference would have to be consistent
across all the events to bias our results.
The empirical identification assumes that the timing of the various law changes is
exogenous across markets. To validate the parallel trends assumption and the exogeneity across
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event timing, we break down the analysis by year using dummy variables to capture a series of
years before and after the passage of the law. If the cause of our expected changes is the timing
of the law, we should expect effects to happen after the year before the law is passed but not
before then. That is, the pre-trend should be distinct from the post-trend. We thus generate a
series of indicators in which reform (t-4) is equal to one for all firm year observations that are
four or more years before the passage of the law in the focal country and zero otherwise. Reform
(t-3) equals one for observations that are exactly three years prior to the passage of the law, and
reform (t-2) is one for observations that are two years prior to passage. Reform (t) indicates the
year of passage of the law while reform (t+1), reform (t+2), reform (t+3) and reform (t+4)
analogously indicate one, two, three and four or more years following the passage of the law.
The omitted year is the year before the passage of the law so that all the coefficients for these
indicators show the effect (or the “difference”) relative to that baseline year (see Branstetter et al.
2006).
Our estimates are rather conservative because the sample consists only of firms from
countries that experience the ‘treatment’ at some point. Similar studies relying on multiple events
often include firms from countries that never experience the treatment as additional ‘controls’,
usually because the number of treated observations is too low to generate sufficient statistical
power. The inclusion of non-treated observations is not technically incorrect, but it does
introduce the possibility that the treated and never-treated groups suffer from unobserved
heterogeneity that may violate the parallel trends or other identification assumptions. By
including only firms from treated countries, the comparison sets are more homogenous, reducing
concerns of unobserved variation and relying strictly on the exogeneity of timing across events.
The combination of these considerations allows us to draw relatively strong inferences. In
addition, all our models include firm fixed effects, eliminating time invariant unobserved
heterogeneity between firms. We also include year fixed effects to control for macroeconomic
effects that may cause fluctuations in global alliance activity.
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RESULTS
Table 2 shows the summary statistics and correlations for our variables of interest. Table
3 shows the results for the models in which we examine the effect of the passage of the laws on
new international alliance formation and the composition of firms’ alliance networks. The
positive and significant coefficient of post reform in model 1 is supportive of Hypothesis 1a (p <
0.01), which suggested that the number of international ties that a firm has access to would rise
with the strengthening of formal IPR protection in its home country. In model 2 we break down
the effects by year using a set of dummy variables to indicate the time in relation to the year
before the passage of the law.
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE
Figure 1 shows the coefficients from model 2 plotted (with vertical lines indicating the
95% confidence interval). There is a significant rise in the number of international alliances
corresponding exactly with the passage of the law (reform (t)). This spike is sustained at a
significant level for one more year (reform (t+1)), following which the change becomes less
evident.
INSERT TABLES 2 AND 3 HERE
Next, we examine the difference in the strength of this effect between firms from patent
intensive and non-patent intensive industries. These results are shown in models 3 and 4.
Hypothesis 1b suggested that firms from patent intensive industries would display a more
pronounced increase in the number of international ties than those from non-patent intensive
industries. The positive and significant coefficient of the triple difference term in model 3 lends
support to this hypothesis (p < 0.05). In model 4 we break down this triple difference by year and
observe that the statistical distinction between these groups spikes exactly coincident with the
passage of the law (patent intensity x teform (t)). Further, the statistically significant distinction
between them is sustained for at least three years following the passage of the law. These results
offer some confidence that the mechanisms driving the changes are specifically related to IPR
protection and not simply other factors correlated to IPR law changes.
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Hypothesis 2 suggested that the passage of the law would facilitate access to a greater
diversity of cross-national partners for firms in the focal country. This is tested in models 5 and
6. Now the dependent variable is partner national diversity. The positive coefficient of post
reform in model 5 is in line with our expectation, though it is only marginally significant (p <
0.1). The timing effects in model 6 however demonstrate a clear spike in the national diversity of
alliance partners following reform. Note that the spike in partner diversity appears to arrive in the
year following the passage of the law but is sustained for longer than the changes observed in
model 2 for the number of international partners. We explore this in more detail in the discussion
section.
Table 4 displays how the effect of network centrality on the propensity to garner
international ties changes following the passage of IPR laws. To do this we interact post reform
with various measures of centrality. We do not use the centrality for years after the law was
passed because post reform centrality itself is affected by the passage of the law, making it
subject to the “bad control” problem that creates biased estimates (Angrist and Pischke, 2008).
Instead, we interact post reform with centrality from the year prior to the passage of the law—
this gets at our interest in whether the law “democratizes” tie formation by accruing fewer new
ties to firms that were of high status in the network before the law was passed. As we observe
from the negative and significant coefficients in models 7, 9 and 11, hypothesis 3 receives strong
support (p < 0.001). The timing effects are shown in models 8, 10 and 12. They demonstrate that
centrality plays an important role before the passage of the laws but a relatively insignificant role
subsequent to law changes.
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE
Figure 2 charts the coefficients from model 10, clearly displaying this decline. The drop in
the relevance of centrality as a determinant of tie formation appears to commence in the year
prior to the passage of the law, after which it remains stable or continues to decline. We consider
this further in the discussion.
INSERT TABLES 4 AND 5 HERE
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Table 5 shows the results for models using various measures of closure as the dependent
variable. The positive and significant coefficients of the post reform variable in models 13, 15
and 17 lend support to Hypothesis 4 (p < 0.01 in all models), which suggested that firms would
tend to adopt more closed networks following the passage of the law.
INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE
Models 14, 16, and 18 show that the increase in closure corresponded exactly with the
passage of the laws, and Figure 3 displays these coefficients for network density (model 16). The
spike in closure coincided exactly with the passage of the laws and the increase was sustained
over time. We observed nearly identical effects across the different measures of closure.
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE
Table 6 contains the results from models in which we examine how centrality affects the
change in closure post reform. All the models in table 6 use constraint as the measure of closure,
though the results are practically unchanged when we use density or bridging ties as the DV. The
results from table 5 demonstrated that on average closure clearly increases across all firms
following the institution of reforms, in line with hypothesis 4. Models 19, 21 and 23 in table 6
interact the post reform dummy with different measures of centrality. We find a negative and
significant coefficient on each of these interaction terms (p < 0.01 or lower) indicating that the
increase in network closure following reform is significantly lower the higher the centrality of
the firm in question. Models 20, 22 and 24 show the breakdown of these effects by year which
further demonstrate how this change unfolds over time. We see the difference in levels of closure
between firms that differ in centrality gets stronger and more negative immediately following the
passage of the reforms. These results are strongly supportive of hypothesis 5. Figure 4 graphs the
coefficients by year from the interactions terms in model 22.
INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE
Robustness Checks
We examine our results in a variety of alternative specifications and subsamples. We
measure partner diversity as a logged count of the number of countries in which firms have
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partners rather than as the Herfindahl based measure shown in models 5 and 6 and the results are
robust. We also run the models in table 5 using a non-normalized count of bridging ties as the
dependent variable and the results are practically unaltered. We use the European classification
of patent intensive industries in place of the American one and find the results in models 3 and 4
to be qualitatively unchanged. Further, we include quite stringent county-year fixed effects rather
than year fixed effects and find our results to be robust3. We replicate all our analyses after
dropping firms from China and India, respectively, and find them all to be qualitatively
unaltered. The only significant difference we observe is that the coefficient on the triple
difference in model 3 is no longer statistically significant at the 0.05 level when the firms from
China are dropped, though it is still positive and of a comparable magnitude. Further, for the
models in table 4 that use centrality measures, we replicate the results using the centrality from 2
and 3 years before the passage of the law rather than the year before and find the results to be
robust.
Despite these robust results our approach has limitations. An important concern would be
that the observed effects could be driven by something unrelated to IPR protection. These
regulatory changes do not occur in isolation: they are often accompanied by other events that
could make the climate in the country more favorable for foreign firms or increase exposure to
global competition. Though this concern is substantially alleviated by the fact that we base our
identification on a range of events across different countries and the fact that the timing of the
observed effects coincides precisely with treatment, it is not altogether eliminated. Further,
almost all the countries in our sample are emerging or underdeveloped economies. This casts
doubt over whether the results we observe may be generalizable institutional changes in more
developed markets. What we observe can be best understood as local average treatment effects
for the set of countries in our sample. Furthermore, our sample only consists of firms that have
entered at least one alliance over the course of the study period. While this is not a particularly
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Country-Year fixed effects are only feasible in models with triple differences as in all the other models they are
collinear with the post reform variable.
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stringent restriction in many industries, some industries do not engage in much alliance activity
and may respond in other ways to IPR strengthening. Yet these non-network responses are
beyond the scope of the study to begin with.
DISCUSSION
We examined the effect of the strengthening of laws protecting IPR on firms’ alliance
network structure and composition. Our findings suggest that stronger formal IPR protection
does provide a significant boost to international alliance formation for firms from the country
that passes the reforms. Further, we find that it also facilitates access to partners from a wider
variety of countries. IPR protection also levels the playing field substantially in terms of access
to international partners—under weaker formal protection centrality (as an alleged status signal)
plays a critical role in determining the choice of partner. The strengthening of legal IPR
protection however facilitates improved access to the global alliance network for more peripheral
firms. We also find that network closure based security mechanisms take on increased
importance following the strengthening of formal protection. This effect is more pronounced for
firms that are of lower status. Following the reforms, a wide range of less prominent actors
become active in the network. The absence of the threat of reputation loss as a disciplining
mechanisms means that an alternative mechanism of protection needs to be employed by
partners of these firms. Our results suggest that as a consequence they form more dense
networks, thus drawing on the social monitoring and disciplining qualities of closed networks
(Coleman 1988).
The examination of alliance formation using a natural experiment based diff-in-diff design
is an important contribution of this study. While the “micro” transaction cost drivers of alliance
formation are theoretically well understood (Hennart 1988; Williamson 1995), there have been
few empirical studies attempting to establish a clear causal relationship between the “macro”
regulatory environment (North 1990) and firms’ propensities to collaborate. In this paper we are
able to leverage a series of legal changes that happened in close succession to identify a spike in
alliance activity corresponding precisely to the timing of formal IPR protection. This is an
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important empirical validation of the macro-institutional theory of alliance formation as well as a
solid foundation on which we build an examination of questions relating to network structure and
the complementary or substitutable nature of macro institutions and informal network structures.
Scholars have highlighted the lack of empirical research examining the institutional origins
of networks (Powell et al. 2005). This study is an important step towards the goal of
understanding how institutional influences shape the way firms associate with each other.
The spike in the number of international alliances to which a firm has access is not
sustained indefinitely. The number of new ties rises significantly for a couple of years and then
returns to pre-IPR change levels. However, the breadth of countries from which the firm has
partners is sustained for a longer period. These two results in combination would suggest that
what is being observed is effectively a re-working of the firms’ alliance networks following the
environmental shift. There is most likely a certain baseline rate at which firms tend to form new
relationships. While this rate is exceeded in the years immediately following the passage of the
IPR strengthening law changes, firms cannot keep this up indefinitely due to simple resource and
value-creation limits. However, these new ties lend a different complexion to the alliance
network in terms of partner nationality, which is more sustainable than having a larger network.
An important theoretical contribution is to emphasize the distinction between different
informal institutional mechanisms (signal- vs. information/norm-based) and how they respond to
form institutions. Signal-based mechanisms of new tie formation have been well explored by
organizational scholars (e.g. Podolny 1993; Gulati 1995). Firms tend to use status or reputation
as a signal for trustworthiness. These signals take on greater importance with increasing
altercentric uncertainty (Podolny 2001). As this uncertainty is mitigated by the passage of IPR
laws, the signaling benefits of status in generating new ties declines, indicating a substation
effect. Importantly, this results in a more egalitarian distribution in the new ties generated
following the passage of the laws. We also observe that this effect starts to become observable in
the year just prior to the passage of the law, which may be driven by anticipation on behalf of the
firms in relation to the imminent law. An interesting direction in which to take this research
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would be to examine if other uncertainty-lowering mechanisms have similar effects in
diminishing the importance of status in new tie formation.
The other informal mechanism of IPR protection we explore is related to network closure,
which constrains knowledge circulation and increases the odds of social norm enforcement. The
perception in the literature has typically been that informal and formal mechanisms serve
essentially the same purpose, despite notable exceptions (e.g. Poppo and Zenger 2002). Our
study represents an important contribution to this literature in offering empirical support for the
arguments that these mechanisms are in fact complementary. While formal legal protections are
an important inducement for firms to collaborate, they do not appear to be sufficient in and of
themselves to mitigate all security related concerns. It is likely that certain types of concerns are
best addressed through formal protection whereas others require social mechanisms to be
invoked. While contracts and courts are a valid deterrent to opportunistic behavior, scholars have
shown that these are in reality rarely invoked explicitly (Eccles 1981; Mayer and Argyres 2004).
Being embedded within a network of closely connected partners facilitates the process of making
and enforcing these adjustments as well as creating a valid threat of social ostracism to ward off
unilateral opportunistic behavior. Our results suggest that these mechanisms become more
important as firms engage in more extensive and wide ranging collaborative activity, with
strengthening of formal IPR protection serving as a means to increase the supply of such
opportunities, particularly to peripheral firms which may be younger.
From a policy perspective, our results suggest that the introduction of formal IPR
protections is beneficial for home country firms, particularly those in high technology industries,
because it allows them to increase the odds of collaborations with foreign partners. Further, it
also facilitates a leveling of the playing field in terms of which firms are able to obtain these
collaborations. However, since network development is endogenously driven (firms display a
tendency to form ties to others from within their own pre-existing networks), facilitating an entry
point into valuable networks for local firms may help seed the process of generating international
ties that may bring valuable technology and other resources to firms in locations with weak IPR.
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Figure 1: Effects of law change on number of new international ties by year (Model 2)

Figure 2: Effect of law change on the importance of centrality for future tie generation (Model 10)
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Figure 3: Effect of law change on ego network density by year (Model 18)

Figure 4: Moderating effect of centrality on closure following law change (Model 22)
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Table 1: Countries in sample and year of reform
Country
Argentina
Brazil
Chile
China
Colombia
India
Indonesia
Mexico
Philippines
Portugal
Thailand
Turkey
Venezuela

Year of reform
1996
1997
1991
1993
1994
1999
1991
1991
1997
1992
1992
1995
1994
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Table 2: Summary Stats and Correlations
Sl No Variable
1 New international ties

Mean

SD

Min

Max

1

2

3

4

5

0.046

0.203

0.000

3.401 1.000

2 Partner National Diversity

0.027

0.119

0.000

0.925 0.444 1.000

3 Network Constraint

0.159

0.352

0.000

1.125 0.392 0.307 1.000

0.024

0.134

0.000

4.220 0.192 0.597 0.246 1.000

0.049

0.210

0.000

1.000 0.300 0.658 0.424 0.652 1.000

b

4 Normalized bridging ties
5 Network density

b

6

7

8

9

10

11

6 Degree

0.168

0.403

0.000

4.234 0.094 0.530 0.494 0.570 0.434 1.000

7 Eigenvector Centrality

0.009

0.080

0.000

3.828 0.083 0.242 0.099 0.213 0.138 0.348 1.000

8 Component Size

0.856

2.480

0.000

9.512 0.078 0.410 0.410 0.424 0.327 0.781 0.374 1.000

9 Patent Intensive

0.197

0.398

0.000

1.000 0.021 0.004 0.049 -0.008 0.003 0.028 0.040 0.044 1.000

10 New domestic ties b

0.022

0.145

0.000

2.565 0.328 0.324 0.256 0.173 0.336 0.055 0.039 0.043 -0.003 1.000

11 Liberalization dummy

0.347

0.476

0.000

1.000 0.018 0.019 0.030 0.033 0.022 0.048 -0.002 0.034 -0.138 0.015 1.000

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

12 Cap Flows openness

50.206

14.261

13 Reformed Neighbors

5.132

1.969

0.000

7.000 -0.008 0.032 0.037 0.018 0.022 0.071 0.029 0.051 0.071 0.022 -0.417 -0.164 1.000

14 PolCon

0.316

0.342

0.000

0.890 0.009 0.010 0.022 0.010 -0.011 0.034 -0.008 0.026 -0.080 0.017 0.465 0.319 -0.173 1.000

15 FDI Inflows

0.187

0.195

-0.046

0.621 0.001 0.013 0.056 0.014 0.030 0.057 0.027 0.045 0.082 0.004 -0.494 -0.232 0.386 -0.670 1.000

16 Hi-Tech Exports

0.353

0.640

0.000

2.731 -0.035 -0.026 -0.016 -0.021 -0.027 -0.007 0.014 -0.021 0.050 -0.014 -0.313 -0.029 0.407 -0.434 0.754 1.000

1.146

1.211

0.000

4.624 -0.056 -0.045 -0.006 -0.019 -0.038 0.033 0.007 -0.003 -0.029 -0.021 0.229 0.294 0.256 -0.013 0.397 0.591 1.000

18 Exports b

2.977

0.493

1.887

4.258 0.004 0.031 0.037 0.048 0.046 0.078 0.020 0.051 -0.060 0.024 0.456 0.250 0.192 -0.124 0.077 0.244 0.462 1.000

19 GNI per capita b

-0.025

0.879

-1.109

2.780 0.002 -0.007 0.048 0.021 0.005 0.063 -0.001 0.039 -0.107 0.003 0.716 0.588 -0.441 0.336 -0.015 0.099 0.566 0.317 1.000

20 Internet connectivity b

0.748

0.876

0.000

3.569 -0.056 -0.046 -0.014 -0.028 -0.049 0.024 0.004 -0.011 -0.045 -0.023 0.313 0.360 0.223 0.157 0.163 0.451 0.919 0.430 0.515 1.000

21 Flight takeoffs b
22 Urban Pop. Fraction b

0.928

0.825

-1.005

2.493 -0.015 -0.006 0.029 -0.011 -0.001 0.027 0.019 0.019 0.093 -0.012 -0.521 -0.269 0.337 -0.581 0.862 0.680 0.342 -0.166 -0.065 0.161 1.000

1.328

0.364

0.938

2.196 -0.007 -0.028 0.020 -0.006 -0.018 0.023 -0.005 0.011 -0.106 -0.015 0.643 0.489 -0.515 0.277 -0.051 0.025 0.436 0.103 0.852 0.458 -0.021 1.000

17 Cellphone Connections

b

25.000 100.000 0.033 0.026 0.064 0.036 0.026 0.067 0.009 0.050 -0.093 0.035 0.577 1.000

N = 166080. Al l correlations of abs olute magnitude >0.02 are s ignificant at the p<0.05 level
b: Logged Variable
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Table 3: Effect of IPR Law Change on International Tie Formation

Post Reform

DV: New international
ties b
Model 1
Model 2

DV: New international
ties b
Model 3
Model 4

0.0169**

0.0159**

0.0083+

(0.0046)

(0.0045)
0.0061*

(0.0046)

Patent Intensity x Post Reform

DV: Partner National
Diversity c
Model 5
Model 6

(0.0026)
Reform (t-4)

-0.0078

-0.0084

-0.0037

Reform (t-3)

(0.0072)
-0.0060

(0.0072)
-0.0073

(0.0038)
-0.0021

Reform (t-2)

(0.0086)
-0.0064

(0.0082)
-0.0067

(0.0029)
-0.0022

Reform (t)

(0.0052)
0.0104*

(0.0052)
0.0081

(0.0024)
0.0036

Reform (t+1)

(0.0045)
0.0203**

(0.0049)
0.0159*

(0.0035)
0.0090+

Reform (t+2)

(0.0059)
0.0052

(0.0057)
0.0015

(0.0043)
0.0137**

Reform (t+3)

(0.0080)
0.0136

(0.0085)
0.0121

(0.0043)
0.0160*

Reform (t+4)

(0.0081)
0.0082

(0.0080)
0.0083

(0.0063)
0.0146

(0.0068)

(0.0085)

Patent Intensity x Reform (t-4)

(0.0068)
0.0025

Patent Intensity x Reform (t-3)

(0.0040)
0.0082

Patent Intensity x Reform (t-2)

(0.0091)
0.0023

Patent Intensity x Reform (t)

(0.0050)
0.0139*

Patent Intensity x Reform (t+1)

(0.0049)
0.0263***

Patent Intensity x Reform (t+2)

(0.0051)
0.0229***

Patent Intensity x Reform (t+3)

(0.0048)
0.0126+

Patent Intensity x Reform (t+4)

(0.0066)
0.0015

Controls

Y

Y

Y

(0.0038)
Y

Y

Y

Firm Fixed Effects
Year Fixed Effects

Y
Y

Y
Y

Y
Y

Y
Y

Y
Y

Y
Y

166080
11072

166080
11072

166080
11072

166080
11072

166080
11072

166080
11072

Number of Observations
Number of firms

b: Logged Variable; c: Partner National Diversity is a Herfindahl type measure of the spread of a firm's partners across
countries; Standard errors reported in parentheses are Heteroscedasticity robust and clustered by country
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Table 4: Effect of centrality on new international tie formation post reform
DV: New international ties b
Post Reform
Degree

c
b

x Post Reform

Model 7
0.0431***
(0.0052)
-0.1202***
(0.0104)

Model 8

c

c
b

Model 10

Reform (t-3)
Reform (t-2)
Reform (t)
Reform (t+1)
Reform (t+2)
Reform (t+3)
Reform (t+4)
1

Centrality Measure x Reform (t-4)
1

Centrality Measure x Reform (t-3)
1

Centrality Measure x Reform (t-2)
1

Centrality Measure x Reform (t)
1

Centrality Measure x Reform (t+1)
1

Centrality Measure x Reform (t+2)
1

Centrality Measure x Reform (t+3)
1

Centrality Measure x Reform (t+4)

Model 12

-0.0149***
(0.0016)

x Post Reform

Reform (t-4)

Model 11
0.0358***
(0.0050)

-0.2899***
(0.0435)

Eigenvector x Post Reform
Component Size

Model 9
0.0208***
(0.0046)

-0.0275**
(0.0077)
-0.0399**
(0.0097)
-0.0394***
(0.0074)
0.0172**
(0.0054)
0.0326***
(0.0070)
0.0195*
(0.0071)
0.0308**
(0.0086)
0.0272*
(0.0100)
0.0772**
(0.0202)
0.1401***
(0.0186)
0.1837***
(0.0415)
0.0009
(0.0156)
-0.0121
(0.0122)
-0.0193
(0.0130)
-0.0285**
(0.0086)
-0.0548**
(0.0147)
Y
Y
Y
166080
11072

-0.0113
(0.0070)
-0.0113
(0.0088)
-0.0102
(0.0058)
0.0112*
(0.0048)
0.0221**
(0.0060)
0.0070
(0.0075)
0.0161+
(0.0079)
0.0112
(0.0068)
0.2112***
(0.0339)
0.3751***
(0.0796)
0.3293*
(0.1317)
0.0083
(0.0751)
-0.0379
(0.0574)
-0.0061
(0.0394)
-0.0521
(0.0442)
-0.1338*
(0.0594)
Y
Y
Y
166080
11072

-0.0222**
(0.0070)
-0.0298*
(0.0100)
-0.0288**
(0.0068)
0.0161**
(0.0051)
0.0302***
(0.0061)
0.0155+
(0.0072)
0.0262**
(0.0085)
0.0221*
(0.0087)
0.0091**
(0.0026)
0.0166***
(0.0028)
0.0209**
(0.0059)
-0.0011
(0.0018)
-0.0032+
(0.0015)
-0.0026
(0.0018)
-0.0040*
(0.0014)
-0.0072**
(0.0022)
Y
Y
Y
166080
11072

Y
Y
Y
Controls
Y
Y
Y
Firm Fixed Effects
Y
Y
Y
Year Fixed Effects
166080
166080
166080
Number of Observations
11072
11072
11072
Number of firms
b: Logged Variable
c: Variable is measured in the year before the passage of the regulation
1: The 'Centrality Measure' is different for Models 18, 20 and 22. In Model 18 it is degree, in Model 20 it is Eigenvector and in Model
22 it is Component size, all of which are measured in the year prior to the passage of the law
Standard errors reported in parantheses are heteroscedasticity robust and clustered by country
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Table 5: Effect of IPR Law Change on Network Closure
c

DV: Network Constraint
DV: Normalized Bridging Ties b
DV: Network Density
Model 13
Model 14
Model 15
Model 16
Model 17
Model 18
0.0602**
0.0196**
0.0253**
Post Reform
(0.0166)
(0.0047)
(0.0068)
-0.0398+
-0.0073
-0.0113
Reform (t-4)
(0.0193)
(0.0063)
(0.0084)
-0.0097
-0.0075
-0.0112+
Reform (t-3)
(0.0156)
(0.0043)
(0.0063)
0.0012
-0.0071**
-0.0089*
Reform (t-2)
(0.0119)
(0.0022)
(0.0034)
0.0294*
0.0100+
0.0122*
Reform (t)
(0.0104)
(0.0048)
(0.0055)
0.0645***
0.0179**
0.0250**
Reform (t+1)
(0.0118)
(0.0052)
(0.0063)
0.0997***
0.0275***
0.0375***
Reform (t+2)
(0.0122)
(0.0057)
(0.0064)
0.0968***
0.0326**
0.0392***
Reform (t+3)
(0.0182)
(0.0092)
(0.0088)
0.0777**
0.0266*
0.0378*
Reform (t+4)
(0.0222)
(0.0118)
(0.0137)
New domestic ties b
0.5674***
0.5672***
0.0816***
0.0817***
0.4196***
0.4197***
(0.0349)
(0.0352)
(0.0188)
(0.0185)
(0.0365)
(0.0367)
Liberalization dummy
0.0059
-0.0099
0.0064
0.0062
0.0109
0.0106
(0.0137)
(0.0141)
(0.0071)
(0.0067)
(0.0087)
(0.0071)
Cap Flows openness
0.0001
0.0001
0.0000
0.0001
-0.0000
0.0000
(0.0003)
(0.0004)
(0.0002)
(0.0002)
(0.0002)
(0.0002)
Reformed Neighbors
-0.0033
-0.0054
-0.0023
-0.0027
-0.0022
-0.0032
(0.0056)
(0.0076)
(0.0020)
(0.0021)
(0.0035)
(0.0034)
PolCon
0.0586
0.0494
0.0275
0.0279*
0.0219
0.0232
(0.0384)
(0.0299)
(0.0173)
(0.0116)
(0.0236)
(0.0153)
FDI Inflows
0.1465
0.1275
0.0052
-0.0063
0.0515
0.0386
(0.1327)
(0.1171)
(0.0453)
(0.0470)
(0.0507)
(0.0559)
Hi-Tech Exports
0.0091
0.0194
-0.0009
0.0057
-0.0129+
-0.0030
(0.0174)
(0.0126)
(0.0063)
(0.0074)
(0.0073)
(0.0094)
Cellphone Connections b
-0.0307
-0.0201
-0.0010
-0.0012
-0.0055
-0.0063
(0.0230)
(0.0248)
(0.0097)
(0.0097)
(0.0117)
(0.0118)
Exports b
0.0394
0.0227
0.0227*
0.0132+
0.0388*
0.0225+
(0.0295)
(0.0232)
(0.0098)
(0.0074)
(0.0139)
(0.0121)
GNI per capita b
0.0341
0.0085
0.0295
0.0173
0.0372
0.0182
(0.0566)
(0.0380)
(0.0197)
(0.0149)
(0.0238)
(0.0165)
0.0185
0.0201
0.0071
0.0088
0.0133
0.0158
Internet connectivity b
(0.0275)
(0.0288)
(0.0113)
(0.0110)
(0.0139)
(0.0141)
Flight takeoffs b
0.0295
0.0252
-0.0049
-0.0051
-0.0002
-0.0003
(0.0257)
(0.0238)
(0.0083)
(0.0083)
(0.0105)
(0.0096)
Urban Pop. Fraction b
-0.3521*
-0.2444+
-0.0401
-0.0292
-0.0462
-0.0341
(0.1456)
(0.1279)
(0.0463)
(0.0392)
(0.0581)
(0.0480)
Constant
0.3172+
0.2536+
-0.0009
0.0118
-0.0289
0.0007
(0.1734)
(0.1362)
(0.0644)
(0.0518)
(0.0830)
(0.0692)
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Firm Fixed Effects
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Year Fixed Effects
166080
166080
166080
166080
166080
166080
Number of Observations
11072
11072
11072
11072
11072
11072
Number of firms
b: Logged Variable; c: Normalized bridging ties are calculated as count of bridging ties / degree; Standard errors reported in parentheses
are heteroscedasticity robust and clustered by country

39

Table 5: Effect of centrality on change in network closure post reform
DV: Constraint
Post Reform
Degree

c
b

x Post Reform

Model 19
0.1248***
(0.0134)
-0.2959***
(0.0251)

Model 20

c

c
b

Model 22

Model 24

-0.0390***
(0.0037)

x Post Reform
-0.0294
(0.0213)
-0.0488*
(0.0163)
-0.0336**
(0.0095)
0.0695***
(0.0092)
0.1411***
(0.0117)
0.1871***
(0.0115)
0.1935***
(0.0163)
0.1665***
(0.0227)
-0.1405*
(0.0501)
0.0599
(0.0931)
0.1234*
(0.0477)
-0.1646***
(0.0320)
-0.3565***
(0.0616)
-0.4005***
(0.0645)
-0.4107***
(0.0577)
-0.3683***
(0.0524)

Reform (t-4)
Reform (t-3)
Reform (t-2)
Reform (t)
Reform (t+1)
Reform (t+2)
Reform (t+3)
Reform (t+4)
1

Centrality Measure x Reform (t-4)
1

Centrality Measure x Reform (t-3)
1

Centrality Measure x Reform (t-2)
1

Centrality Measure x Reform (t)
1

Centrality Measure x Reform (t+1)
1

Centrality Measure x Reform (t+2)
1

Centrality Measure x Reform (t+3)
1

Centrality Measure x Reform (t+4)

Controls
Firm Fixed Effects
Year Fixed Effects
Number of Observations
Number of firms

Model 23
0.1097***
(0.0149)

-0.3897**
(0.0978)

Eigenvector x Post Reform
Component Size

Model 21
0.0654**
(0.0167)

Y
Y
Y
166080
11072

Y
Y
Y
166080
11072

-0.0412*
(0.0184)
-0.0115
(0.0156)
-0.0006
(0.0119)
0.0327**
(0.0105)
0.0696***
(0.0122)
0.1056***
(0.0125)
0.1036***
(0.0177)
0.0835**
(0.0217)
-0.0471
(0.1073)
0.0160
(0.0517)
0.0981*
(0.0419)
-0.2626*
(0.1068)
-0.4071*
(0.1535)
-0.4481**
(0.1459)
-0.5122***
(0.1044)
-0.4018**
(0.1070)
Y
Y
Y
166080
11072

Y
Y
Y
166080
11072

-0.0353+
(0.0196)
-0.0434*
(0.0150)
-0.0295*
(0.0099)
0.0605***
(0.0102)
0.1213***
(0.0143)
0.1643***
(0.0141)
0.1681***
(0.0160)
0.1446***
(0.0199)
-0.0159+
(0.0087)
0.0107
(0.0116)
0.0202**
(0.0049)
-0.0221***
(0.0047)
-0.0449**
(0.0104)
-0.0497***
(0.0106)
-0.0507***
(0.0097)
-0.0470***
(0.0093)
Y
Y
Y
166080
11072

Y
Y
Y
166080
11072

b: Logged Variable
c: Variable is measured in the year before the passage of the regulation
1: The 'Centrality Measure' is different for Models 18, 20 and 22. In Model 18 it is degree, in Model 20 it is Eigenvector and in
Model 22 it is Component size, all of which are measured in the year prior to the passage of the law
Standard Errors reported in parentheses are heteroscedasticity robust and clustered by country

